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1. Introduction 
Over the past twenty years, a growing number of African governments have launched 
social protection programs to provide assistance to households that are ultra-poor, labor-
constrained, and/or caring for orphan or vulnerable children. Usually these programs aim at 
reducing poverty and vulnerability by improving consumption, nutrition, health status, school 
attendance and educational outcomes.1 While most of the programs in Latin America provide 
cash transfers conditional on meeting certain requirements (mainly school attendance, regular 
visits to health center for growth monitoring and updating of vaccination cards), the majority 
of the cash transfer programs in African countries are ‘unconditional’: they are paid directly 
to beneficiary households without explicit conditions or labor requirements.  
A number of papers have discussed the pros and cons of conditional cash transfers 
(CCTs) as opposed to unconditional cash transfers (UCTs), from both a public and private 
perspective (see, for example Baird et al. 2013, de Brauw and Hoddinott, 2011 and Handa et 
al. 2009). From the public perspective, imposing conditions may help the government to 
overcome information asymmetries: government may be aware of the benefits associated with 
preventive health care or education but individuals may be unconvinced or unaware of these 
benefits, they may have a shorter time horizon because of lack of risk management 
instruments, or there may be cultural barriers to investing in certain activities such as girls’ 
education. From the private perspective, imposing conditionality on cash transfers can 
partially solve the disagreements within households regarding the allocation of resources, 
strengthening the bargaining position of individuals whose preferences are aligned with the 
government‘s preferences, and who may otherwise lack bargaining power within the 
household. Indeed, the majority of CCTs pays money preferentially to female recipients. 
Furthermore, insights from behavioral economics emphasize that conditionality can impose a 
constraint to those households who have hyperbolic discount functions, i.e. when they tend to 
choose a smaller-sooner reward over a larger-later reward as the delay occurs sooner rather 
than later in time, undertaking actions that can reduce their own welfare. In such cases, 
households may be better off when constraints are imposed that reduce or limit their ability to 
trade-off future for present consumption (Laibson, 1997).   
                                                
1 For a comprehensive overview of the impacts of cash transfers programs see Fizbein et al. (2009) and Tirivayi 
et al. (2016). 
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However, there are also drawbacks to imposing conditionality. From a public perspective, 
it increases the administrative costs and complexity of running a cash transfer program 
(Caldes et al. 2006). From a private perspective, imposing conditionality may reduce the 
effectiveness of the targeting if the poorest households find the conditions too difficult to 
meet, de facto hindering their participation to the cash transfer program. Moreover, imposing 
conditionalities may be considered paternalistic and may induce beneficiaries to take options 
that are suboptimal, e.g. if returns to education are too low. Finally, from a human right 
perspective, some argue against attaching conditions to the receipt of the cash transfers, 
especially because the purpose of the programs is to reduce or mitigate the effects of extreme 
poverty (Freelander, 2007).  
Within this debate, several contributions have sought to identify the isolated effect of 
conditionality as the key feature to optimize behavior and maximize the effectiveness of cash 
transfers programs (Bastagli et al. 2016). The results are mixed. Handa et al. (2009) evaluate 
the behavioral impact of conditions on spending behavior in rural Mexico by the Progresa 
CCT program. Their results show that transfer income is not spent on education, food and 
clothing differently from general income suggesting that cash transfers exert only an income 
effect, i.e. the ‘hard conditionality’ imposed by the program does not induce behavioral 
changes (the so called ‘substitution effect’). Teixeira et al. (2011) evaluate the impact of the 
CCTs Takopora in Paraguay on healthcare utilization and school attendance. They exploit the 
heterogeneity with respect to knowledge of the need to comply with conditionalities as 
identification strategy and find no significant role of ‘hard conditionality’. Akresh et al. 
(2013) conduct a randomized experiment in rural Burkina Faso to estimate the impact of 
alternative cash transfer delivery mechanisms (CCTs versus UCTs) on education. The results 
indicate that unconditional and conditional cash transfer programs have a similar impact, 
increasing enrollment for children who are traditionally favored by parents for school 
participation, including boys, older children, and higher ability children. However, the 
conditional transfers are significantly more effective than the unconditional transfers in 
improving the enrollment of “marginal children” who are initially less likely to go to school, 
such as girls, younger children, and lower ability children. They conclude that conditionality 
actually plays a critical role in benefiting children who are less likely to receive investments 
from their parents. Robertson et al. (2013) investigate the effects of CCTs and UCTs on birth 
certificates, vaccine uptake and school attendance in a randomized control trial in Zimbabwe 
and find inconclusive results on the role of ‘hard conditionality’. Birth registration increased 
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significantly more in the CCT group, vaccine uptake increased significantly more in the UCT 
group, and no differences were detected in school attendance.      
As opposed to these findings, several contributions find that the ‘hard’ conditionality 
imposed in the CCTs significantly contribute to amplify the effects of the cash transfers on 
desired outcomes. Analyzing Progresa in Mexico, de Janvry et al. (2006) compare the effect 
of the ‘explicit conditionality’ and a pure income effect which in their analysis simulates the 
potential impact of a UCT on education. They find that a dollar spent on conditional cash 
transfers would give an effect on school enrollment eight times higher with respect to a dollar 
spent on increasing household’s income. Using the same data, de Brauw and Hoddinott 
(2011) took advantage of the fact that some beneficiaries did not receive monitoring and 
compliance forms for a substantial period of time after the program was launched and, 
therefore, were unaware that the transfers were conditional. They found that receiving the 
form and understanding the condition exerted a stronger effect on school enrollment. Schady 
and Araujo (2008), exploiting differential parental beliefs on the school attendance 
requirement attached to the program, find similar results from the Ecuadorian program Bono 
de Desarrollo Umano. Using data from a randomized control trial in Malawi, explicitly 
designed to evaluate the differential impact of CCT and UCT on the school attendance rates 
of teenage girls, Baird et al. (2011) find that conditionality contributes to amplify the effects 
of the cash transfers on investments in human capital (i.e. better educational and health 
outcomes). ‘Hard conditionality’ has also been shown to matter for health behavior outcomes. 
Using data from the Colombian program Familias en Acción Attanasio et al. (2015) estimate 
that children would receive less preventive care visits if the program was not conditional on 
these visits.  
Overall, while most of previous contributions focus on the role of the conditionality, as 
opposed to unconditionality, we argue that the difference between CCTs and UCTs is more 
nuanced for two reasons. First, as the meta-analysis by Baird et al. (2013) point out, the level 
of enforcement makes an important difference when it comes to measuring the role of ‘hard 
conditionality’. Second, and more relevant for this paper, many existing UCTs impose some 
sort of informal or indirect conditionality (Pellerano and Barca, 2014). The informal or 
indirect conditionality, often referred as ‘soft conditionality’, may occur in several ways. The 
use of cash transfers can be implicitly conditioned by policy actions that are implemented in 
conjunction with the transfer. This happens, for example, when beneficiaries are involved in 
training/education sessions that provide information on the ‘best use’ of the transfers, or when 
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community-based case management systems are put in place to oversee the ‘good use’ of the 
transfer. Examples of this ‘soft conditionality’ implemented through the messaging are the 
Child Grants Program in Lesotho and the Colombian Familias en Acción. In this latter 
program beneficiary women are involved in training sessions to share information about 
adequate child care, health and nutrition. Sometimes the name of the transfer scheme itself 
signals the existence of an implicit contract between provider and recipient as to how the 
resources are expected to be used. Examples of this ‘soft conditionality’ implemented through 
the labeling are again the Child Grants Program in Lesotho and the Tayssir program in 
Morocco, a cash transfer program aimed at increasing the rural primary school completion 
rate with two main components: a ‘hard’ conditional component in which cash transfers are 
paid conditional on attendance or enrollment, and a ‘labeled’ unconditional component in 
which cash transfer are explicitly tied to an educational goal but without requirements on 
attendance or enrollment. 
This paper focuses on the role of ‘soft conditionality’, implemented through both 
‘labeling’ and ‘messaging’, to evaluate the effect of the Child Grants Program in Lesotho on 
household total consumption, food consumption, food security for children, schooling related 
expenses and school enrollment. As with many programs in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the 
transfers are paid without imposing any kind of explicit conditionality. However, in practice 
recipients received at each payment round at the pay point a clear message that the cash 
transfer should be spent on the interest and needs of children. The clear ‘messaging’, 
evidenced also by a qualitative study (OPM, 2014), is the key feature of the program: it turned 
out to be a strong means to achieve the goals of improving consumption, education-related 
expenses, and food security for children.  
Under standard models of decision-making, such ‘soft conditionality’ should have no 
bearing on how the money is spent - the cash transfers should be fully fungible with other 
income sources, and the program should lead to an income effect, but not necessarily 
behavioral change. However, a large body of empirical evidence reports relationships between 
income sources and the resulting behavioral response (for surveys, see Thaler, 1990; Fraker, 
1990; Haveman and Wolfe, 1995). There are a number of explanations for why ‘soft 
conditionality’ implemented through ‘labeling’ and ‘messaging’ is an effective instrument to 
reaching the desired outcomes of the programs. The behavioral economics literature suggests 
that ‘labeling’ the additional source of income and ‘messaging’ on the desired use of the 
additional income could matter if they facilitate mental accounting (Thaler, 1990): 
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beneficiaries may consider the cash transfers as entering into a mental account specifically 
addressed to the improvement of education, nutrition and health of children, not fungible with 
other accounts. Another explanation, not alternative to the previous one, is the important role 
of social sanctioning in contexts such as Lesotho and SSA in general. The communities in 
which the program has been implemented were exerting close scrutiny over how cash 
transfers were used through structures created ad hoc by the program – the village assistance 
committees – and the traditional structures – village chiefs. This kind of social pressure can be 
very binding, particularly given the fact that selection into the program is partly associated 
with a community based targeting process. The direct involvement of the community on the 
selection of beneficiary households determined a credible threat of being excluded from the 
program if not complying with the expected behavior.  
Few studies investigate the role of ‘labeling’ and ‘messaging’ in consumption and 
educational outcomes. Benhassine et al. (2015) use data from the Tayssir program in Morocco 
to estimate the impact of the ‘labeled’ cash transfer component, which consisted of small cash 
transfers made to fathers of school-aged children in poor rural communities, not conditional 
on school attendance but explicitly labeled as an education support program. They find 
evidence of large gains in school participation. Moreover, their analysis shows that adding 
‘hard conditionality’ made almost no difference in their context. On the contrary, Edmons 
(2002) investigates the effect of labeling on consumption in the context of a child benefit in 
Slovenia but finds no evidence for it.  
Our contribution to the existing literature is three-fold. First, our paper assesses the 
effectiveness of CGP in positively affecting behaviors that are meant to be influenced by the 
conditionality. Contributions on the role of social protection programs in SSA is rapidly 
growing as more data on randomized control trials become available (Davis et al. 2012). We 
add to this new collection of evidence emerging from SSA by evaluating Lesotho’s CGP. 
Second, the paper investigates the specific role of ‘soft conditionality’ in affecting the desired 
outcomes, the improvement of the well-being of children and schooling. Unfortunately, our 
identification strategy cannot be based on an experimental design, since there is no 
heterogeneity in the implementation of two key components of the ‘soft conditionality’, the 
labeling and messaging. The message that the cash transfer should serve for the improvement 
of the well-being of children was spread equally in all community councils and 98 percent of 
the treated households declared to be aware of the main use of the transfers.  
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Nevertheless we adopt two intuitive empirical strategies that allow us to investigate 
whether the CGP has changed the preferences of households in favor of outcomes that 
improve the well-being of children. First, we test the hypothesis that households spend 
transfer income differently from earned income. Following Handa et al. (2009), we compare 
the marginal propensity to spend out of transfer to the marginal propensity to spend out of 
income. We expect that if program ‘soft conditionality’ is binding, and transfer income is 
used to support children, then transfer income will be spent at a higher rate on goods such as 
education and clothing relative to general income. Second, we compare standard difference-
in-difference (DID) program effects with the ex-ante expected effects given baseline 
expenditure elasticities to test whether the program simply moves households along their total 
expenditure Engel curve or in fact shifts that curve, suggesting a behavioral change in favor of 
children well-being induced by the messaging. With the analysis of the specific role of ‘soft 
conditionality’, the paper also partially contributes to the debate on pros and cons of CCTs 
versus UCTs because it aims to provide evidence of the role of “soft conditionality” in 
reaching desired outcomes.  
Finally, the paper contributes to the literature on gender differences on the impact of cash 
transfers programs focusing on the gender of household head as determinant of both changes 
in behaviors and role of ‘soft conditionality’.2 Here we do not refer to models of household 
resources allocation á la Bourguignon and Chiappori (1998) and Browning et al. (1994). 
Indeed, in our sample, female headed households, which represents 50 per cent of the total 
sample, have different characteristics than the male ones. The large majority of female 
household heads are widows, therefore there is no bargaining taking place within the family.3 
We are interested in testing the hypothesis that female household heads are more sensitive to 
                                                
2 Several studies directly test whether unearned income in the form of transfer is spent differently by males and 
females. Using data from South-Africa, Duflo (2003) shows that pension received by women had a large impact 
on the anthropometric status of girls, specifically on granddaughters. In contrast, when pension is received by 
men, no effect is found on the nutritional status of children. There is some evidence that women have different 
preferences over expenditures from men, including expenditures on food (Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Shady 
and Rosero, 2008). Moreover, qualitative studies conducted in Progresa communities in Mexico are consistent 
with the hypothesis that women are more likely to spend income on health and education relative to men (Adato 
et al. 2000). Asfaw et al. (2014) find that an unconditional cash transfers program in Kenya had larger and 
positive impact on female-headed household compared to male-headed households. One of few exception is 
Benassine et al. (2015) which find no differences between cash transfers paid out to fathers and to mothers. 
Additional contributions are reviewed by Yoong, Rabinovic and Diepeveen (2012).  
3 Eighty-five per cent of the female household heads are widows, two per cent are married, and the remaining 
thirteen per cent are single mothers. The characteristics of male household heads are completely different: nine 
per cent of them are widowers, eighty-three per cent are married, and the remaining eight per cent are single 
father.  
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‘labeling’ and ‘messaging’ than male counterparts in meeting the desired use of the cash 
transfers. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the program, data 
collection and the characteristics of the evaluation sample. Section 3 presents the estimation 
methods and the main results. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Background and experimental design  
2.1 Description of the program, targeting and data collection  
The Kingdom of Lesotho ranks 161 out of 188 countries on the United Nations Human 
Development Index. Gross domestic product has grown considerably in the past two decades, 
at an average annual 3.9 percent rate (World Bank, 2014). However, agriculture has lagged 
behind other sectors and about 90 percent of farmers depend on subsistence agriculture for 
their livelihoods. Further, between 10 and 30 percent of the population suffers from food 
insecurity (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 2009). Despite economic growth, poverty 
rates remain high: 57 percent of the population are still estimated to live below the basic 
needs poverty line of US$1.08 per day, and 34 percent below the food poverty line of 
US$0.61 per day. HIV/AIDS prevalence in Lesotho is estimated to be the second highest in 
the world. The epidemic has also left behind over 300,000 orphans. 
In response to the challenges of poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion, the 
Government of Lesotho indicated in the National Strategic Development Plan 2012-2017 its 
commitment to promote social protection. An important component of the country’s social 
protection response is the Child Grants Program (CGP). At the time of evaluation the CGP 
was implemented in ten community councils spread across five districts (Berea, Leribe, Mafeteng, 
Maseru and Qacha’s Nek).4 Initially the CGP provided a transfer of M360 (USD 36) every 
quarter to poor and vulnerable households selected through a combination of proxy means 
testing (PMT) and community validation. As of April, 2013 the payment was adjusted to take 
into account the family size as follows: 1-2 household members (M360), 3-4 members 
(M600) and 5 and above members (M750) per quarter. The amount of cash transfers was 
equivalent to 17% of the beneficiary average baseline expenditure. 
                                                
4 As of August 2016, the CGP is provided to 26,681 beneficiary households in 36 community councils across the 
ten districts of the country. 
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The initial stated objective of the CGP is to “provide a social protection system through 
regular and predictable cash transfers to families living with orphans or vulnerable children 
(OVCs) in order to encourage, fostering and retention of OVCs within their families and 
communities, and to promote their human capital development” (Ayala Consulting, 2011). 5 
In practice, due to operational issues around identifying OVCs, the program focused on poor 
households with at least one child (under seventeen years) as a more appropriate targeting 
criterion. The program is currently managed and financed by the Ministry of Social 
Development, though during the pilot phase considered in this study the program received 
financial support from the European Union and the technical support from the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF)-Lesotho.  
The Child Grants Program was designed and implemented in three phases. Phase 1 
started in October 2009/April 2010 in three community councils, reaching about 1,250 
households. The pilot was expanded in early 2010 under phase 1 to include three additional 
councils and then again under phase 2, covering an additional 3,400 households.  Scale up 
during phase 3 was used to implement an impact evaluation using a randomized control trial 
design. First, in each community council, public lotteries randomly selected half of all the 
electoral divisions (EDs) into the group of cash transfers recipients, the so called treatment 
EDs. The other half, excluded from the disbursement of the payments, constitute the control 
EDs.6 Second, in both treatment and control locations, targeting of the eligible and non-
eligible households was carried out according to a combination of proxy means testing (PMT) 
and community validation. Household information was collected through a community-wide 
census following a community mobilization event, where households were informed about the 
program. The collected information was used to create the National Information System for 
Social Assistance (NISSA), a repository of household socio-economic information intended 
to be used for future social assistance programs by the Government of Lesotho.  The PMT 
predicts the likelihood of a household having a certain level of consumption expenditure 
(used as an indicator of poverty) based on a number of indicators of wealth such as dwelling 
conditions, household assets and other household socio-economic characteristics. Households 
were categorized into five distinct groups: ultra-poor, very poor, poor, less poor and better off. 
The community validation exercise was completely independent from the PMT and only 
                                                
5 OVC are defined as household residents between zero and seventeen years old with at least one deceased 
parent, or a parent who is chronically ill, or whose main caregiver is chronically ill. 
6 The total number of EDs were 96, a number which ensures that the randomization was done across a sufficient 
number of clusters. 
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households categorized as “ultra-poor” or “very-poor” by the PMT and selected by members 
of their community as being the “poorest of the poor”, with at least one child 0-17 years old, 
were defined eligible for the program. This procedure was adopted in order to limit inclusion 
errors as much as possible. After selection and notification through printed certificates, 
households were enrolled in the program in July and August 2011 and the first payments 
started in September 2011. Further details on the program, targeting procedure, randomization 
and survey design can be found in Pellerano et al. (2012). 
Beneficiary and non-beneficiary households, both eligible and non-eligible were 
interviewed at baseline before the first payment, between June and August 2011, and were 
tracked and interviewed again at follow-up, between June and August 2013. The two rounds 
of the survey took place at the same time of the year to avoid seasonality bias.    
 
2.2 ‘Messaging’: how did it work in practice 
The CGP was introduced with the objective of improving the living standards of children. 
As a result, beneficiary households were reminded at every payment date that the money was 
meant for the welfare of their children and to ensure they had enough food, adequate clothing 
and shoes. There were also a strong emphasis on education, particularly on school uniforms. 
They were also reminded that the money was not for meeting their own needs or for 
purchasing household items and furniture. All the CGP recipients interviewed during the 
follow-up survey report having received instructions at the pay point to spend the money on 
children. 
A qualitative study reports that CGP program officials provided regular and consistent 
messages to beneficiaries on the purpose and use of the CGP at pay points (OPM, 2014): 
“We are told by the social workers that we must buy food, clothes and school needs for our 
children, not to buy household furniture. We are also told that there are people who monitor 
how the money is being spent” (beneficiary in Mefeteng district). 
“[We are told that] the children should look in a manner that shows they are taken care of” 
(beneficiary in Leribe district). 
The message was further reinforced by the oversighting of community members to make sure 
the beneficiaries did not ‘misspend’ the transfer. Qualitative evidence suggest that the 
oversight provided by fellow community members arose from dissatisfaction with not being 
11 
 
selected and wanting to make sure that at least those receiving the money would use it in the 
way it ‘should’ be spent (OPM, 2014). Moreover, efforts were made to encourage families to 
inform the children of the CGP’s purpose, to increase children’s awareness of their 
entitlement and right.  
 
2.3 Characteristics of evaluation sample, attrition and balance 
The baseline survey comprised 3,054 households roughly equally distributed between 
treatment and control areas and across eligible and non-eligible households. Table 1 reports 
the baseline sample size, by population group. Due to budgetary restrictions, in the follow-up 
survey the sample size of non-eligible households was reduced to roughly half of the baseline 
survey, leading to an overall follow-up sample of about 2,300 households (1,484 eligible 
households and 800 non-eligible). The follow-up survey aimed to re-interview the households 
with the same children present in the baseline study (the objective was to “follow the 
children”). Sample attrition made this panel unbalanced. The issue of sample attrition was 
tackled in different ways for eligible and non-eligible households. For the former group, a 
tracking protocol was established to regulate how children in households that moved outside 
their original community should have been followed. In particular, the protocol established 
the inclusion into the study sample for those households that moved to a district capital in one 
of the regions of the study or the capital city Maseru, or moved to a location within thirty 
minutes or ten kilometers distance from the village where the household was originally 
sampled. For the latter group, replacement took place, i.e. households that moved outside their 
original community were replaced by new households. Overall 2,150 of the 3,054 households 
interviewed at baseline were tracked in the follow-up study, which represents a number of 
households lower than the target follow-up sample (2,300). Sample attrition for the overall 
sample was therefore 6% (150 over 2,300 households not tracked at follow-up). Further 
analysis shows that there were systematic differences in the non-response to the follow-up 
survey between treatment and control groups (respectively, 12% and 8%). To address these 
issues and obtain unbiased estimates of the impact of the program, the sampling weights have 
been adjusted for selective non-response, by calculating the probability of households being 
retained in the sample on the basis of key household characteristics at baseline.  
Statistical test of mean differences are performed to compare baseline control and 
treatment groups. We find that the randomization was accurate. Treatment and control 
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households are comparable across household characteristics (with the exception of the number 
of children aged 0-5 and the number of female adults aged 18-59 that are higher in the 
treatment group), poverty indicators, household assets (with the exception of the proportion of 
households that own pigs, which is higher in control group), and community level indicators. 
Full details on the characteristics of evaluation sample, attrition and balance are in Pellerano 
et al. 2014). This paper is based exclusively on data from panel households that were 
observed both at baseline and follow-up. Table 2 shows the distribution of the sample used for 
the analysis across treatment and control areas, and eligible and non-eligible status. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
We conduct the analysis in three steps. First, we adopt a difference-in-difference (DID) 
approach to estimate the direct impact on CGP on the outcomes that are meant to be directly 
affected by the ‘soft conditionality’, namely i.e. household expenditure, food security (for 
adults and children), schooling related expenses and school enrollment (section 3.1). Second, 
to assess the role of ‘soft conditionality’, we “unpack” the impact of the cash transfers from 
the impact of conditions softly imposed through the messaging in affecting the outcomes. We 
adopt a direct test of the hypothesis that households spend transfer income differently from 
earned income. In particular, we estimate the ‘substitution’ (behavioral change) and ‘income 
effect’ through a comparison of the marginal propensity to consume out of general income 
and out of cash transfers. A marginal propensity to consume out of transfer significantly 
greater than the marginal propensity to consume out of general income would suggest that 
‘soft conditionality’ plays a role (section 3.2). Third, we further investigate the role of 
conditionality studying whether the CGP changed the preferences of households in terms of 
their consumption behavior, inducing relative greater expenditure on clothing for children and 
school-related expenses. We compare DID effects with ex-ante expected effects given 
baseline expenditure elasticities. If the program simply moves households along their total 
expenditure Engel curve (no behavioral change), the ex-ante expected behavior should line up 
with the ex-post actual response of households to the program. On the contrary, if the 
program lead to a shift of the Engel curve (behavioral change) the program ex-ante expected 
behavior in matters related to the conditionality should be underestimated with respect to the 
actual impact (section 3.3).  
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3.1 Difference in Difference approach 
The framework for the basic analysis of the effect of CGP is based on a comparison of 
program beneficiaries with a group of non-beneficiaries serving as controls, all interviewed 
before the program began and again two years later, adopting a difference-in-difference 
approach (DID). 
To estimate the potential impact of the program on the variables that are meant to be directly 
affected by the conditionality, or on any other variable, one would like to observe average 
outcomes in treatment areas both with and without the program. The difference between the 
two would be entirely attributable to the program, and the parameter of interest, Δ, would be 
estimated as 
(1)  Δ = E(Y1,A-Y0,A|T=1) 
Where Yj,k is the outcome of interest and the two subscripts denote whether a household lives 
in a treated area (j=1) or not (j=0) and whether the observation is collected before receiving 
the cash transfers (k=B) or after (k=A). T equal to 1 (0) denotes treatment (control) areas and 
E denotes the expected value. The problem with this approach is that it is impossible to 
observe the outcomes of interest without treatment in treatment areas and therefore it is 
impossible to compute the second term on the right-hand side of (1). The approach to this 
problem extensively used in the literature is to use control areas to estimate the counterfactual. 
By comparing outcomes between treatment and control groups, the average impacts of the 
cash transfer program can be estimated under two weak assumptions. The first assumption 
states that, in the absence of the program, there are common time effects across treatment and 
control areas, i.e. 
(2) E(Y0,A-Y0,B|T=1)= E(Y0,A-Y0,B|T=0) 
The assumption specifies that control households must evolve from the baseline to the follow-
up period in the same way treatments would have done had they not been treated. Moreover, 
it implies that treatment and control households may be affected in the same way by macro 
shocks or by any other policy implemented simultaneously. This assumption allows us to 
estimate the effects of the program on the outcomes as 
(3) Δ =E(Y1,A|T=1,X)-E(Y0,B|T=1,X)+ E(Y0,B|T=1,X)-E(Y0,A|T=1,X) 
   =[E(Y1,A|T=1,X)-E(Y0,A|T=0,X)]- [E(Y0,B|T=1,X)-E(Y0,B|T=0,X)] 
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                                  A’                                              B’ 
where X is the set of observable covariates at household and community level that are likely 
to affect the outcome variables.  
The second assumption underlying this estimator is that, if there are differences in the 
outcome variables across treatment and control areas due to unobservable factors, these are 
fixed over time. By netting B’ out of A’, one obtains the effect of the program on the outcome 
variables. 
Both assumption (2) and (3) must hold in order for the DID estimation of the program impact 
to be unbiased. 
Equation (4) represents the regression equivalent of DID: 
(4)          
tiiitiititi XdCGPddCGPdY ,,32,10, )2013__(2013__ µβββββ ++∗+++= ∑  
Y represents the outcome of interest; d_CGP  is a dummy equal to 1 if household received the 
treatment; d_2013 is a dummy equal to 0 (1) if the observation is a baseline (follow up) one; 
d_CGP*d_2013 is the interaction between the intervention and the time dummies, X is the set 
of household and community baseline characteristics which includes household demographic 
composition, education, age and marital status of the household head, community prices for 
individual items, community wages and community shocks (the full set of covariates is 
reported in Table A2 in the appendix). µi,t is an error term. As for the coefficients, we are 
mainly interested in estimating β3 which is the double difference estimator capturing the 
treatment effect.  
Since we are also interested in investigating whether the impact of CGP is different in 
female headed households with respect to male headed households, we estimated equation (5) 
which represents the regression equivalent of a triple difference in outcomes (treatment vs 
control, follow-up versus control, female headed households versus male headed households). 
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In this case we are mainly interested in estimating γ3 which is the treatment effect for male 
headed households and the sum of γ3 and δ3 which represents the treatment effect for female 
headed households. 
We identify the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect.7 The average effect of the treatment on the 
actual treated (ATT) is also estimated but, since the results are fully consistent to those 
indicated by the ITT models and the magnitudes of the effects are only marginally higher, we 
decided to report only the ITT models estimates. Results based on the ATT models are 
available upon request. 
3.1.1 Impact of CGP on total expenditure, food and non-food expenditure 
In Table 3, we report our estimates of the impact of the program on total expenditure, food 
and non-food expenditure. For these outcome variables, and also for the others shown in the 
following tables, we present the results in two different columns: the first reports the 
difference in difference estimates for the whole sample without considering the potential 
heterogeneous impacts by gender of the household heads, i.e. β3 from equation (4); the second 
column reports the difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of CGP for male and 
female household heads, respectively, γ3 and (γ3 + δ3). In all estimates we control for a large 
set of household and community characteristics listed in the appendix (Table A2). Moreover, 
estimates are adjusted using sampling weights by calculating the probability of households 
being retained in the sample on the basis of key household characteristics at baseline, and 
selective non response (for details see Pellerano et al. 2014). Moreover, the significance 
testing accounts for clustering of standard errors due to sampling design. 
Table 3 shows that the CGP had a positive effect on total and food expenditure, especially in 
households with female household head, and did not affect expenditure on non-food items. 
While for food expenditure we are not able to disentangle which members of the family were 
enjoying more food available, we believe that this will have positive effect on food security of 
all members, including children. This result is indeed reflected on several indicators of food 
                                                
7 Unsurprisingly, the degree of compliance for picking up money was very high (93% according to the survey 
response, 96% according to administrative records). 
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security in Table 4. We consider whether the household incurred in food shortage, the period 
spent in extreme shortage, whether any member of the household (adults and children 
separately) had access to smaller or fewer meals, and went to sleep hungry in the previous 
week.  The results indicate that CGP significantly contribute to the reduction of the months of 
extreme food shortage, independently on the household head gender, and a significant 
increase in the number of meals for both adults and children, and a reduction of both adults 
and children that went to bed hungry in households with female household head.  
As mentioned above, expenditure on non-food items was not affected by CGP. However, if 
we distinguish different items of expenditure, we find a heterogeneous impact of the CGP. 
While it did not affect expenditure for adults’ clothing, the impact for children’s clothing is 
positive and statistically significant for both female and male headed households (see Table 
5). Furthermore, no impact is detected on expenditure on health, fuel and housing (see Table 
6). The results on expenditure on health deserve a particular note. Public primary healthcare 
in Lesotho is officially free and the cash transfer was rarely used to pay for formal healthcare. 
In some cases participants in qualitative research (OPM, 2014) reported that recipients felt 
better able to purchase over-the-counter medicine (such as those available from small shops 
without prescription), but this was not detected in the quantitative survey. 
 
3.1.2 Impact on CGP on  school-related expenditure and school enrollment 
Table 7 reports the impact of CGP on expenditure on education (total and per pupil 6-12, 13-
19) as well as the impact on several school-related expenditure, including i.e. school fees, 
exams fees, textbooks and photocopies, stationary and school bags, uniform and school shoes. 
The results show a large and highly significant effect on expenditure in education. For pupils 
6-12 the impact is positive and significant for both male and female headed households, while 
for pupils 13-19 the impact is significant only for male headed households. When we 
disentangle by item groups, the strongest impact is detected for expenditure on school 
uniforms and shoes, for both female and male headed households. There are two factors that 
explain this strong results: first, qualitative analysis (OPM, 2014) documents that expenditure 
on clothing was strongly encouraged at pay point as an example of expenditure in favor of the 
wellbeing of children. Moreover, expenditure on new uniforms and shoes is also a highly 
‘visible’ way to spend money for children and this evidence would contribute to support the 
hypothesis that ‘soft-conditionality’ may work because of social pressure.  
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Table 8 shows the results for school enrolment. We consider whether the child is currently 
enrolled in any educational grade, distinguishing between boys and girls education8. The 
results are striking and are consistent with Sebastian et al. (2016)9.  CGP positively and 
significantly affect school enrolment of boys but not of girls, especially in female headed 
households. Several factors can explain these findings. Poor households tend to invest more 
on education of male children because the returns to education of girls for the household as a 
whole is much lower than the returns to education of boys: in Lesotho, as in many other 
developing countries, girls become part of the husband family and do not contribute anymore 
to the maintenance of the original family. This argument is even stronger for female headed 
households, mostly widow and unmarried, for which education of boys represents their 
insurance for the old age.  
 
3.2  “Unpacking” the role of program’s conditionality 
Focusing only on expenditure items, we employ an intuitively appealing approach, proposed 
by Breunig and Dasgupta, (2005) and Handa et al. (2009), to test whether ‘soft conditionality’ 
is playing a role in affecting behaviors of beneficiary households. If conditionality is binding, 
program transfers will exert an income and substitution effect on household spending 
behavior, while general income only exerts an income effect on such behavior. If the 
substitution effect is big, the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of transfer income 
for items related to children’ wellbeing will be larger than the MPC out of general income; if 
the substitution effect is small or zero, then the program only exerts an income effect and the 
two MPCs will be statistically equal.  
We estimate the following equation: 
(6)     tiiitititi XdincomevalueCGPY ,3,2,10, 2013__ µβββββ +++++= ∑  
Where Y represents the logarithm of annual household expenditure of the ith household (either 
total expenditure or expenditure on each of the other items), food security or school 
enrollment. CGP_value is the logarithm of annual transfers from administrative data. The 
                                                
8 We also analyzed the impact of CGP on school enrollment by age groups. The results are not reported here but 
are available upon request. 
9 Using the same data but adopting a different analytical framework, Sebastian et al. (2016) specifically looks at 
impact of CGP on children schooling, labor and time use, with a particular focus on differentiated impacts by 
gender and household structure. 
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variable income is the logarithm of the annual monetary income (not including the cash 
transfers). X is a vector representing the same set of control variables as in (4) and (5), and u 
is the error term. Expenditure, monetary income, and transfer amounts are logged to 
normalize values and account for skewed distributions. Therefore, our equations for 
expenditure items are estimated in double logarithmic form: our hypothesis test translates into 
a test of the equality of elasticities of transfers and general income. β1 represents the MPC out 
of transfer income and β2 represents the MPC out of general income. 
To determine if the impact of a CGP maloti is different from a monetary income maloti, we 
test the following null and alternative hypothesis: 
(7) 21210 :     : ββββ ≠= aHH  
Soft conditionality plays a role if, for outcome variables related to the conditionality, the MPC 
out of transfer income (β1) is significantly greater than the MPC out of general income (β2). In 
this case the null hypothesis will be rejected in favour of the alternative and transfer income 
plays both a ‘substitution’ and an ‘income’ effect. We expect the substitution effect of the 
transfer income to be strongest for expenditure items related to the children wellbeing that 
should be directly affected by the conditionality, i.e. clothing and footwear for children and 
education. 
The monetary income variable includes the following component (real annual values): 
wage income10, income from livestock sales, income from livestock by-products sales, 
income from crop sales, net profit from non-agricultural activities, public transfers (excluding 
CGP transfers), private transfers, and transfers from residents and non-residents family 
members or friends. From this measure of monetary income an important component is 
missing: the value of livestock purchased. To cope with potential income underestimation and 
partially solve the issue of a missing component, we added the number of livestock purchased 
as additional control.11 However, the inclusion of these additional control does not change 
significantly the main results. 
                                                
10 Wage income is calculated as follows: “average days of work in a week” * “wage level for agricultural 
activities” * 52 (number of weeks per year). Gender specific wage levels are taken into account. 
11 We could not calculate the value of livestock purchases because data on prices were not available and we 
opted for adding the number of livestock purchased instead of imputing the prices. 
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3.2.1 Endogeneity of household income 
The income variable included in the previous analysis presents a problem of endogeneity 
since income and consumption expenditure are jointly determined by the households through 
the allocation of time between work and leisure. Moreover, unobserved ability or tastes may 
determine both income and the allocation of that income to different consumption items 
(food, alcohol and tobacco, schooling, etc). This unobserved heterogeneity may cause bias 
estimates. In order to minimize this potential bias, we also estimate household fixed-effects 
models which allows to get rid of the fixed unobserved household level component. The 
fixed-effect model generate consistent estimates under the underlying assumption that the 
unobserved component affecting both earning capacity and expenditure decisions is fixed 
over time. We believe this is a plausible assumption given the two year time frame used in our 
analysis. 
 
3.2.2 Comparison of MPCs 
Tables 9, 10 and 11 present summary results of the spending responses out of transfer and 
general income. The OLS results and the household fixed effect model results are reported, 
respectively, on the left-hand and right-hand columns. The analysis for total expenditure, food 
expenditure and non-food expenditure is reported in Table 8. For these broad outcome 
variables, the differences between the two propensities to consume on non-food items are not 
statistically significant, while for food items the marginal propensity to consume out of 
income is significantly greater than the marginal propensity to consume out of transfer. Both 
results seem to suggest that substitution effect is not taking place. However, if we disentangle 
expenditure in non-food items in the different components, the results are more 
heterogeneous. Table 9 shows the MPCs comparison for expenditure on clothing (for male 
and female adults and children), health, fuel, housing and other. The results are striking: 
MPCs out of general income and out of transfer on clothing for adults, health, fuel, housing 
and other are not statistically significant. On the contrary, the MPC out of transfer on clothing 
for children is positive and significantly greater than the MPC out of income, meaning that, in 
this case, both a substitution and an income effect are taking place. These results hold for both 
male and female headed households. We get similar results for school-related expenditure. 
Table 10 reports the comparison between MPCs for expenditure on total education and per 
different items (school fees, exam fees, expenditure on uniforms and school shoes, school 
maintenance and expenditure for stationery and books). These results show that a substitution 
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effect (behavioral change) is taking place for expenditure on education, especially for 
expenditure on school uniforms and shoes.   
 
3.3 Testing for elasticity changes 
The findings presented in the previous section suggest that transfer income is spent 
differently than general income for items that were meant to be affected by the ‘soft-
conditionality’. Indeed, for clothing for children, education and especially for expenditure in 
school uniforms and shoes both an income and substitution effects (behavioral change) are 
taking place. In this section, focusing only on expenditure items, we propose another test for 
potential behavioral changes induced by the program. Following The Kenya CT-OVC 
Evaluation Team (2012), we unpack how the CGP has affected behavior by using standard 
demand theory to predict how the program ought to impact spending in favor of children, 
based on pre-program expenditure elasticities. Our approach consists on deriving theoretically 
consistent expenditure elasticities from baseline (pre-program) and use these to predict 
household responses to the program. The rational of this kind of analysis is the following: if 
the program simply moves households along their total expenditure Engel curve, the ex-ante 
expected behavior should line up with the ex-post actual response of households to the 
program. If this occurs, no behavioral change is taking place and the ‘soft conditionality’ does 
not play any role. On the contrary, if the ex-post actual response of households to the program 
it is greater than the ex-ante expected one, behavioral changes are taking place and ‘soft 
conditionality’ actually plays a role. 
The principal analytical tool we use to build the baseline elasticities is the Engel curve, 
which relates budget shares devoted to various spending groups to total household 
expenditures and other households characteristics. We estimate the following specification, 
commonly known as the Working-Leser functional form, for which applications can be found 
in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Handa (1996) and The Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation Team 
(2012): 
 (8)       ii CGPEXPXw εβββα ++++= 321 )ln(  
Where wi  is the budget share for commodity i, EXP is household total consumption 
expenditure, CGP is a dummy variable equal to one if the household is in the treatment group, 
and X is the same vector of control variable used in equation (4). 
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Using equation (8), the marginal effect on the budget share of a change in total household 
expenditure is given by equation (9), while the total elasticity expenditure can be derived 
using the formula in equation (10) (Deaton et al., 1989): 
(9)      2)ln(
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Table 12 shows the results of equation (8) for the following expenditure items: food, 
clothing (for male and female adults and children), education (uniform as special educational 
expenditure item), fuel, health, housing and other. The last row provides the calculated 
elasticities at the mean share. Panel A shows the results for the whole sample, while panel B 
and C, respectively, for male and female headed households. The elasticities suggest that fuel 
and housing are basic needs (elasticity less than one), while health, education and clothing are 
luxuries (elasticity greater than one). Food has unit elasticity, a finding that can be explained 
taking into account the fact that our sample is largely composed by agricultural households 
that are partially able to meet their nutritional needs with home production. 
We can now predict the impact of the program on expenditure patterns. The CGP 
provides transfers that correspond to 17 per cent of the beneficiaries average baseline total 
consumption expenditure. Using the elasticity estimates in Table 12, we can predict the 
percentage change in expenditure (at the mean) for each expenditure item considered. These 
are the ex-ante predicted program impacts assuming no behavioral changes. Table 13 
summarizes this exercise. For example, in column 5 in panel A we estimated an elasticity for 
education of 1.121 at baseline. This implies that a 17 per cent increase in total expenditure 
will result in 19.057 per cent increase in expenditure for education (17*1.121=19.057), which 
corresponds to 4.91 maloti when evaluated at the mean level of expenditure at baseline, i.e. 
25.75 maloti (mean level baseline expenditure*per cent increase in 
education=25.75*19.057/100=4.91). In contrast, the actual impact of the CGP on expenditure 
on education is 15.94. This means that the ex-ante simulation under-predicts expenditure on 
education by 11.03 maloti. The impact of CGP is 11.03 maloti more than what we would 
expect at baseline. The difference between actual CGP impact and ex-ante simulation is even 
greater for male headed households (16.56 maloti). Overall, the results presented in Table 13 
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suggest that there are some important differences between actual program effects and what we 
would expect given baseline preferences of targeted households. Indeed, looking across the 
other household items groups, we see that actual program impacts are lower than expected for 
food, clothing for male and female adults, health, fuel and housing and other expenditure, but 
they are higher than expected for clothing for children, education and expenditure for school 
uniforms and shoes, suggesting a behavioral change in favor of children wellbeing induced by 
the program.  
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper uses data collected from a two years randomized experimental design impact 
evaluation (2011-2013) to analyze the effects of the CGP in Lesotho. We focus on the role of 
‘soft conditionality’ implemented through both ‘labeling’ and ‘messaging’ in affecting 
outcomes that should be influenced by the implicit conditionality. It aims to contribute to the 
literature on the effectiveness/appropriateness of explicit/implicit/lack (of) conditionality in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The difference-in-difference estimates show that the program had a 
positive impact on food expenditure, expenditure for clothing (especially for children), 
school-specific expenditures (expenditure for maintenance and especially school uniforms and 
shoes), food security for adults and children and school enrollment of boys. 
The main contribution of this paper is our analysis of whether the program has shifted 
preferences due to the ‘soft conditionality’ implicitly imposed by the program. Most impact 
studies calculate the program impact using a difference-in-difference approach, which we 
present here. However, we go further proposing two different approaches to test whether the 
program may have caused preferences to shift in favor of some goods that are meant to be 
affected by the ‘soft conditionality’.  
First, we test whether households spent transfer income differently from earned income 
comparing the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of transfers with the MPC out of 
general income on goods that ought to be affected by the conditionality. This analysis shows 
that ‘soft conditionality’ did play a role on outcomes most directly associated with the 
labelling of the program (a “child” grant) as well as with the program messaging (heavily 
focused on schooling). The MPC out of transfer is indeed positive and significantly larger 
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than the MPC out of general income for expenses on clothing and footwear for children and 
expenditure on education, especially on school uniforms and shoes. 
Second, we further investigate the role of conditionality studying whether CGP changed the 
preferences of households in terms of their consumption behavior, inducing relative greater 
expenditure on clothing for children and school-related expenses. We compare DID effects 
with ex-ante expected effects given baseline expenditure elasticities. If the program simply 
moves households along their total expenditure Engel curve (no behavioral change), the ex-
ante expected behavior should line up with the ex-post actual response of households to the 
program. Our findings show that the ex-post actual program effects are higher than the ex-
ante expected ones for clothing for children, education and expenditure for school uniforms 
and shoes, suggesting a behavioral change in favor of children wellbeing induced by the 
program. 
Overall, our findings provide support to the effectiveness of ‘soft conditionality’.  
Furthermore, we explore potential gender differences on the impact of CGP comparing male 
and female headed households. Our findings do not provide support for such gender 
differences. 
A key characteristic of the program may have affected the effectiveness of program 
messaging and labelling: the strong involvement of the community in program 
implementation and strong community oversight systems. A community validation exercise 
was carried out jointly with proxy mean testing to select CGP beneficiary households. Village 
Assistance Committees were also constituted to oversee the smooth implementation of the 
programme, often with direct or indirect involvement of traditional authorities. This potential 
link between community monitoring and surveillance over the “good” use of transfers, and 
the role of “high-stature” community members in selection of beneficiaries (and possibly in 
upcoming recertification processes) may create a fear of sanction that resembles hard 
conditionalities. 
To conclude, the results suggest two main policy implications. First, social programs can 
incentivize the achievement of the desired goals of the program through ‘labeling’ and 
‘messaging’, without necessarily imposing any explicit conditionality. Soft-conditioned 
programs tend to be administratively simpler hence less costly to implement for the 
government, they also have reduced transactional costs for beneficiaries, due to the lack of an 
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explicit conditionality monitoring system. Second, programs adopting a soft-conditionality 
approach should carefully consider how to tailor the communication strategy to reflect the full 
array of program objectives.  A too narrowly specified message, if effectively conveyed to the 
beneficiaries and enforced through social monitoring, may limit the potential impact of the 
program. In the case of Lesotho the message was focused on school expenditure and was 
strictly adhered to, but may have hindered impacts on other areas, such as access to health or 
livelihoods diversification. Programs should adopt messaging and labelling approaches that 
empowers beneficiaries in exercising choice, including embarking in higher-risk investment 
that may lead to higher human capital or productivity gains in the long run. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Beneficiary status at baseline 
Beneficiary Status Area Total 
 Treatment Control  
Eligible for CGP 747 (98%) 739 (97%) 1,486 (98%) 
Non Eligible for CGP  779 (100%) 789 (99%) 1,568 (99%) 
Total 1,526 (99%) 1,528 (98%) 3,054 (98%) 
 
Table 2: Beneficiary status in the paneled sample 
Beneficiary Status Area Total 
 Treatment Control  
Eligible for CGP 706 647 1,353 
Non Eligible for CGP  396 401 797 
Total 1,102 1,048 2,150 
 
Table 3: Impact of CGP on monthly expenditure – Maloti, real values (2013 prices) 
  Total Expenditure Food Expenditure Non-food Expenditure 
Household level       
DID (β3) 75.795   64.186*   14.56   
 (1.57)   (1.66)   (0.66)   
DID male hh (γ3)   11.167   4.805   11.157 
   (0.18)   (0.1)   (0.4) 
DID female hh (γ3+δ3)   146.980**   130.600***   17.180 
    (2.76)    (3.00)   (0.73) 
Per capita             
DID (β3) 18.155*   13.981*   4.986   
 (1.68)   (1.67)   (0.90)   
DID male hh (γ3)  14.766   6.192   5.139 
  (1.25)   (0.64)   (0.65) 
DID female hh (γ3+δ3)  20.865*  22.510**  4.319 
    (1.76)   (1.97)   (0.66) 
Observations 2,701 
Notes: Robust t-statistics clustered at the community level are in brackets. Sample weights adjusted for selective 
non-response have been used.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%. All regressions include the set of 
control variables listed in Table A2. 
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Table 4: Impact of CGP on various indicators of food security 
  Food shortage 
Av. months extreme 
shortage Smaller Meals Adults 
Smaller Meals 
Children 
DID (β3) -0.046   -1.765***   -0.018   -0.065  
 (-1.43)   (-4.45)   (-0.39)   (-1.38)  
DID male hh (γ3)   -0.06   -1.546***   -0.006  -0.035 
   (-1.31)   (-2.93)   (-0.10)  (-0.59) 
DID female hh 
(γ3+δ3)   -0.029   -1.989***   -0.032  -0.082 
   (-0.70)   (-3.82)   (-0.59)  (-1.39) 
  
Fewer Meals 
Adults Fewer Meals Children 
Went to sleep hungry 
Adults 
Went to sleep 
hungry Children 
DID (β3) -0.058   -0.078*   -0.090**   -0.053  
 (-1.34)   (-1.65)   (-2.24)   (-1.34)  
DID male hh (γ3)  -0.027   -0.05   -0.064  0.034 
  (-0.45)   (-0.79)   (-0.98)  (0.62) 
DID female hh 
(γ3+δ3)  -0.083*  -0.095  -0.161***  -0.150*** 
  (-1.7)  (-1.54)  (-3.08)  (-3.00) 
Observations 2,705 
Notes: Robust t-statistics clustered at the community level are in brackets. Sample weights adjusted for selective 
non-response have been used.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%. All regressions include the set of 
control variables listed in Table A2. 
 
Table 5: Impact of CGP on monthly expenditure in clothing – Maloti, real values (2013 
prices) 
 Clothing 
  Total Men 
  
Women 
  
Children 
 
DID (β3) 11.207*   -1.451   -1.876   13.064***   
 (1.92)  (-1.11)  (-1.22)  (4.82)   
DID male hh (γ3)   10.235   -2.198   -1.49  15.075*** 
   (1.2)   (-0.96)   (-0.69)  (4.16) 
DID female hh (γ3+δ3)   11.909*   -0.635   -2.291    10.528**  
    (1.87)   (-0.40 )   (-1.04)   (2.90) 
Observations     2,701       
Notes: Robust t-statistics clustered at the community level are in brackets. Sample weights adjusted for selective 
non-response have been used.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%. All regressions include the set of 
control variables listed in Table A2. Note that expenditure on clothing and footwear does not include expenditure 
on school uniforms and school shoes. 
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Table 6: Impact of CGP on expenditure in other monthly non-food group items 
(excluding education) – Maloti, real values (2013 prices) 
 
  Health Fuel Housing and other 
DID (β3) -0.121   -0.365   -9.977   
 
(-0.04)   (-0.03)   (-1.19)   
DID male (γ3)   -0.369   -6.623   -8.109 
 
  (-0.09)   (-0.48)   (-0.68) 
DID female (γ3+δ3)    0.086   6.290   -12.345 
    (0.02)   (0.46)   (-1.37) 
Observations 
 
2,701 
 Notes: Robust t-statistics clustered at the community level are in brackets. Sample weights adjusted for selective 
non-response have been used.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%. All regressions include the set of 
control variables listed in Table A2. 
 
 
Table 7: Impact of CGP on schooling-specific expenditure items – Maloti, real values 
(2013 prices) 
  Education - total Education - per pupil 6-12 Education per pupil 13-19 
DID (β3) 15.941** 
 
5.729** 
 
6.46 
 
 
(2.01) 
 
(2.81) 
 
(0.74) 
 DID male (γ3) 
 
21.027** 
 
6.127* 
 
27.203** 
  
(2.16) 
 
(1.89) 
 
(2.19) 
DID female (γ3+δ3) 
 
10.01 
 
5.316** 
 
-11.78 
   (0.96)    (2.14)   (-1.01) 
Household level 
School fees for the 
year 
Exam fees and other 
school fees School maintenance 
DID (β3) 5.102   1.163   0.550**   
 
(1.25)   (0.89)   (2.13)   
DID male (γ3)   10.312*   2.059   0.287 
 
  (1.78)   (1.25)   (1.24) 
DID female (γ3+δ3)   -0.907   0.088   0.838* 
    (-0.16)   (0.05)   (1.84) 
Household level 
Text books and 
photocopies Stationery and school bags 
Uniform and/or school 
shoes 
DID (β3) -0.119   1.045   6.554***   
 
(-0.09)   (1.5)   (3.23)   
DID male (γ3) 
 
0.488   1.712*   7.091*** 
  
(0.24)   (1.73)   (2.97) 
DID female (γ3+δ3) 
 
-0.857 
 
0.324 
 
5.993** 
    (-0.63)   (0.34)   (2.01) 
Observations 2701 
Notes: Robust t-statistics clustered at the community level are in brackets. Sample weights adjusted for selective 
non-response have been used.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%. All regressions include the set of 
control variables listed in Table A2 
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Table 8: Impact of CGP on school enrollment 
  Currently enrolled 
Currently enrolled - 
Boys 
Currently enrolled - 
Girls 
DID (β3) 0.036   0.063*   0.023   
 (1.48)   (1.83)   (0.69)   
DID male hh (γ3)   0.047   0.052   0.057 
   (1.41)   (1.13)   (1.27) 
DID female hh (γ3+δ3)   0.026   0.078**   -0.016 
    (0.92)   (2.02)    (-0.43) 
Observations 2701 
Notes: Robust t-statistics clustered at the community level are in brackets. Sample weights adjusted for selective 
non-response have been used.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%. All regressions include the set of 
control variables listed in Table A2. 
Table 9: Soft-conditionality results for household expenditure (total, food and non-food) 
  OLS regression Fixed-effect regression 
  
CGP 
transfers 
(log) 
HH 
income 
(log) 
P-value 
for 
difference 
CGP 
transfers 
(log) 
HH 
income 
(log) 
P-value 
for 
difference 
Total expenditure 0.007 0.034*** 0.0002*** 0.016** 0.032*** 0.055* 
 
(1.07) (9.29)   (2.28) (6.42) 
 Total expenditue - MHH 0.004 0.033*** 0.0021*** 0.006 0.026** 0.112 
  (0.57)  (5.85)   0.66 (2.76)   
Total expenditure - FHH 0.011* 0.035*** 0.0051*** 0.030*** 0.036*** 0.564 
 
(1.70) (6.58)   (3.98) (5.16) 
 Food expenditure -0.001 0.032*** 0.000*** 0.014* 0.020*** 0.435 
 
(-0.09) (8.35)    (1.89) (3.5) 
 Food expenditure - MHH -0.008 0.040***  0.000*** 0.001 0.020 0.211 
  (-0.99) (6.37)   (0.13) (1.59)   
Food expenditure - FHH 0.009 0.028*** 0.019** 0.026*** 0.023** 0.721 
 
(1.35) (4.99)   (3.43) (2.85) 
 Non-food expenditure 0.030*** 0.043*** 0.321 0.020* 0.057*** 0.013* 
 
(2.95 ) (6.77)   (1.78) (7.14) 
 Non-food expenditure - MHH 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.853 0.013 0.036** 0.203 
 (3.73) (4.24)  (0.95) (2.98)  
Non-food expenditure - FHH 0.022 0.050*** 0.1382 0.043*** 0.068*** 0.136 
 
(1.58) (5.01) 
 
(3.56) (5.78) 
 Observations 2,701 2,701 
Notes: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%. The MPCs have been estimated with the inclusion of the 
set of control variables listed in Table A2. MHH and FHH stand for Male Household Head and Female 
Household Head, respectively.  
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Table 10: Soft-conditionality results for non-food expenditure (excluding education) 
  OLS regression Fixed-effect regression 
  
CGP 
transfers 
(log) 
HH 
income 
(log) 
P-value 
for 
difference 
CGP 
transfers 
(log) 
HH 
income 
(log) 
P-value 
for 
difference 
Clothing expenditure adult 
males 0 0.021** 0.1034 0.006 0.027** 0.234 
 
(0.03) (2.46) 
 
(0.59) (2.41) 
 Clothing expenditure adult 
males - MHH 0.003 0.031** 0.2016 0.001 0.046** 0.199 
  (0.19) (1.99)   (0.07) (2.09)   
Clothing expenditure adult 
males - FHH -0.007 0.012* 0.1662 0.027** 0.007 0.152 
 
(-0.62) (1.99) 
 
(2.36) (0.9) 
 Clothing expenditure adult 
females -0.004 0.022*** 0.083 -0.019* 0.007 0.113 
 
(-0.36) (3.02) 
 
(-1.8) (0.8) 
 Clothing expenditure adult 
females - MHH 0.005 0.017 0.515 -0.024 -0.003 0.395 
 (0.38) (1.54)   (-1.44) (-0.23)  
Clothing expenditure adult 
females - FHH -0.012 0.027** 0.085* -0.021 0.003 0.354 
 
(-0.68) (2.75) 
 
(-1.26) (0.17) 
 Clothing expenditure children 0.174*** 0.064*** 0.0005*** 0.188*** 0.069*** 0.002*** 
 
(6.94) (4.32) 
 
(6.05) (3.02) 
 Clothing expenditure children - 
MHH 0.202*** 0.091*** 0.010*** 0.193*** 0.106** 0.065* 
 (6.25) (3.45)   (5.42) (2.75)  
Clothing expenditure children - 
FHH 0.142*** 0.035* 0.010*** 0.206*** 0.023 0.000*** 
 
(4.28) (1.93) 
 
(5.14) (0.86) 
 Fuel expenditure 0.027  0.040*** 0.5642 -0.017 0.059*** 0.004*** 
 
(1.48)  (3.15) 
 
(-0.85)  (3.62) 
 Fuel expenditure - MHH 0.026 0.041** 0.5522 -0.026  0.036 0.067* 
  (1.28) (2.71)  (-1.17) (1.39)  
Fuel expenditure - FHH 0.031 0.045** 0.6095 0.012 0.082*** 0.020** 
 
(1.27) (2.55)  
 
 (0.44) (3.66) 
 Health expenditure 1.067  7.371** 0.2700 -3.523  9.563**  0.017** 
 
 (0.26) (2.39) 
 
(-1.02) (2.29) 
 Health expenditure - MHH -1.534 4.357 0.4826 -3.264  12.208** 0.029** 
 ( -0.23) (1.25)  (-0.69) (2.54)  
Health expenditure - FHH 0.408  8.045*  0.1777 -3.946  9.996 0.082* 
 
(0.10) (1.84) 
 
 (-0.70) (1.69) 
 Housing and other expenditure 7.251  28.233*** 0.1178  0.932 34.986*** 0.018** 
 
(0.73) (3.42) 
 
(0.08) (4.07) 
 Housing and other expenditure 
- MHH 18.974 22.357** 0.8514 11.339 14.941 0.859 
 (1.27) (2.29)  (0.71) (1.15)  
Housing and other expenditure 
- FHH  -7.040  31.701** 0.0280 0.709 
 
44.207*** 0.032** 
 
(-0.61)  (2.91) 
 
(0.05) (3.48) 
 Observations 2,701 2,701 
Notes: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%. The MPCs have been estimated with the inclusion of the 
set of control variables listed in Table A2. MHH and FHH stand for Male Household Head and Female 
Household Head, respectively 
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Table 11: Soft-conditionality results for schooling related expenditure 
  OLS regressions Fixed-effect regression 
  
CGP 
transfers 
(log) 
HH 
income 
(log) 
P-value 
for 
difference 
CGP 
transfers 
(log) 
HH 
income 
(log) 
P-value 
for 
difference 
Expenditure in Education 0.127*** 0.082*** 0.082* 0.174*** 0.096*** 0.024** 
 
 (5.99)  (4.82) 
 
(6.43) (3.71) 
 Expenditure in Education - MHH 0.111*** 0.033 0.068* 0.167*** 0.028 0.064* 
 (3.44) (1.25)  (3.68) (0.57)  
Expenditure in Education - FHH 0.154***  0.134*** 0.643 0.214*** 0.092** 0.013** 
 
(5.09) (5.24) 
 
(6.64) (2.46) 
 Exp. School fees 0.036 0.041** 0.867 0.094*** 0.067** 0.434 
 
(1.56) (2.73) 
 
(4.00) (2.71) 
 Exp. School fees - MHH 0.041 -0.006 0.246 0.094*** -0.008 0.037** 
 (1.34) (-0.23)  (3.15) (-0.23)  
Exp. School fees - FHH 0.044 0.104*** 0.213 0.142*** 0.117** 0.678 
 
(1.28) (4.15) 
 
(3.72) (2.7) 
 Exp. Uniform/school shoes 0.162*** 0.091*** 0.010*** 0.224*** 0.092*** 0.001*** 
 
(8.09)  (4.81) 
 
(8.88) (3.39) 
 Exp. Uniform/school shoes - MHH 0.139*** 0.040* 0.009*** 0.239*** 0.041 0.002** 
 (4.70)   (1.68)  (5.7) (0.92)  
Exp. Uniform/school shoes -  FHH 0.190*** 0.126*** 0.100* 0.234*** 0.086** 0.013** 
 
 (5.93) (4.58) 
 
(6.68) (2.05) 
 Exp. Exams fees  -0.001  0.025*** 0.070* 0.007 0.035** 0.098 
 
 (-0.10)  (3.04) 
 
(0.53) (2.52) 
 Exp. Exams fees - MHH 0.008  0.273** 0.394 0.016 0.023 0.806 
  (0.46) (2.13)  (0.87) (1.13)  
Exp. Exams fees -  FHH -0.005  0.022** 0.192 0.017 0.046** 0.304 
 
(-0.28) (2.18)  
 
(0.9) (1.96) 
 Exp. School maintenance 0.008 0.013** 0.574 0.019** 0.018 0.950 
 
(1.00)  (2.01) 
 
(2) (1.44) 
 Exp. School maintenance - MHH  -0.002  0.008 0.403 0.006 -0.022 0.138 
 (-0.22) (0.91)  (0.45) (-1.4)  
Exp. School maintenance -  FHH 0.019* 0.018** 0.934 0.034** 0.047** 0.516 
 
(1.73)  (1.98) 
 
(2.59) (2.37) 
 Exp. Stationery/school bags  0.032*   0.067 0.151 0.064** 0.068*** 0.895 
 
 (1.70)   (5.67)  
 
(2.88) (3.73) 
 Exp. Stationery/school bags - 
MHH 0.033  0.042** 0.795 0.057 0.051 0.909 
 (1.22) (2.14)  (1.54) (1.57)  
Exp. Stationery/school bags -  
FHH 0.038  0.094***  0.114 0.106*** 0.066** 0.346 
 
(1.39)   (5.55) 
 
(3.74) (2.39) 
 Observations 2701 2701 
Notes: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%. The MPCs have been estimated with the inclusion of the 
set of control variables listed in Table A2. MHH and FHH stand for Male Household Head and Female 
Household Head, respectively 
